

Audit Report


**University System of Maryland
Salisbury University**

July 2012



**OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AUDITS
DEPARTMENT OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES
MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

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DEPARTMENT OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AUDITS
MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Karl S. Aro
Executive Director

July 10, 2012

Bruce A. Myers, CPA
Legislative Auditor

Senator James C. Rosapepe, Co-Chair, Joint Audit Committee
Delegate Guy J. Guzzone, Co-Chair, Joint Audit Committee
Members of Joint Audit Committee
Annapolis, Maryland

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We have audited the University System of Maryland (USM) – Salisbury University (SU) for the period beginning August 28, 2008 and ending June 30, 2011. SU is a comprehensive public institution of USM and provides a broad range of baccalaureate programs as well as selected professionally oriented master's programs.

Our audit disclosed that procurement and payment processing procedures were not always followed. In addition, numerous individuals had unnecessary access to critical data and transactions on SU's financial management system. Finally, internal control and record keeping deficiencies existed in the areas of student accounts receivable, the bookstore, credit cards, and materials and supplies for SU's dining services.

An executive summary of our findings can be found on page 5. The USM Office's response to this audit, on behalf of SU, is included as an appendix to this report. We wish to acknowledge the cooperation extended to us during the course of this audit by SU.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads 'Thomas J. Barnickel III'.

Thomas J. Barnickel III, CPA
Acting Legislative Auditor

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Executive Summary

Legislative Audit Report on University System of Maryland Salisbury University (SU) July 2012

- **Procurement and payment processing procedures were not always followed. Our tests disclosed certain payments were made without approval and without verification of rates to the related contracts. Also, computer equipment was procured, totaling \$243,000, without using a statewide contract or competitive bidding.**

SU should ensure that proper invoice approvals are received prior to payment and that prices are in accordance with approved contracts. SU should also ensure the use of statewide technology contracts for the procurement of computer equipment or obtain competitive bids.

- **Formal policies and procedures were not established to provide control over credit cards used for travel purposes. Our tests also disclosed that credit limits were excessive in certain instances, cards were not always promptly cancelled upon employee terminations, and certain transactions were not adequately supported.**

SU should establish a formal policy regarding the administration of its credit cards that are used exclusively for travel-related expenditures, and should establish appropriate credit limits, promptly cancel credit cards, and ensure transactions are properly supported.

- **Internal control weaknesses were noted with respect to the bookstore's purchases and point-of-sale system. For example, three employees had been unnecessarily granted system access capabilities that granted them unrestricted system administrator access.**

SU should use the security features within the system to restrict access to individuals who require such access and adequately segregate critical duties.

- **SU did not properly restrict employee access to certain critical applications on its financial management system. For example, 46 system users did not need access to one or more of 10 critical applications to which they were granted access.**

SU should restrict user access capabilities to only those employees who require such capabilities to perform their normal job duties.

- **Internal control deficiencies were noted with respect to non-cash credit adjustments recorded in student accounts and dietary materials and supplies.**

SU should take the recommended actions to improve internal controls in these areas.

Background Information

Agency Responsibilities

Salisbury University (SU) is a comprehensive public institution of the University System of Maryland and operates under the jurisdiction of the System's Board of Regents. SU offers a broad range of baccalaureate programs as well as selected professionally oriented master's programs. Student enrollment for the Spring 2011 semester totaled 8,055, including 7,387 undergraduate students and 668 graduate students. SU's budget is funded by unrestricted revenues, such as tuition and fees and a State general fund appropriation, as well as restricted revenues, such as federal grants and contracts. According to the State's accounting records, SU's revenues for fiscal year 2011 totaled approximately \$144 million, which included a State general fund appropriation of approximately \$38 million.

Status of Findings From Preceding Audit Report

Our audit included a review to determine the status of the six findings contained in our preceding audit report dated June 22, 2009. We determined that SU satisfactorily addressed these six findings.

Findings and Recommendations

Purchasing and Disbursements

Finding 1

Salisbury University's (SU) procurement and payment processing procedures were not always followed.

Analysis

Procurement and payment processing procedures were not always followed. According to SU's records, its disbursements (excluding payroll) during fiscal year 2011 totaled approximately \$61.3 million. Our test of 16 invoices totaling \$5.9 million disclosed the following conditions:

- Two invoices totaling approximately \$716,000 from utility vendors were not approved prior to payment, as required. In addition, SU could not substantiate that it had verified that the rates paid agreed with the contracted energy rates. Based on our review of the contracts, we were able to substantiate that the appropriate rates were charged by the vendors. Payments to these vendors during our audit period totaled approximately \$6.5 million.
- SU purchased certain computer equipment, totaling approximately \$127,000, under the State Department of Information Technology's (DoIT) hardware master contract without verifying that the prices agreed with the terms of the DoIT statewide contract, as required. DoIT and USM contracts allow for Universities to purchase computer equipment and associated peripherals from selected vendors for an agreed-upon percentage discount from the manufacturer's suggested retail prices. Based on our testing, we were able to substantiate that the appropriate prices were charged by the vendor.
- SU purchased computer equipment totaling approximately \$243,000 without using the aforementioned statewide contracts or a competitive bid process. Although SU procured these goods from a vendor participating in the USM contract, these particular goods were not part of the USM contract and were not eligible for the contract's discounts. To the extent DoIT or USM contracts are not used, SU's procurement policy requires a formal procurement process for procurements exceeding \$100,000. Accordingly, SU could not substantiate that it obtained the equipment at the best possible price.

Recommendation 1

We recommend that SU

- a. obtain the proper invoice approvals prior to payment;**

- b. ensure that prices paid for goods and services are in accordance with the approved contract prices; and
- c. use statewide technology contracts for the procurement of computer equipment, or obtain competitive bids, as required.

Finding 2

Proper controls had not been established over credit cards used for travel-related expenditures.

Analysis

SU lacked adequate controls over its credit cards that are used exclusively for travel-related expenditures. According to the issuing bank's records, as of June 30, 2011, the cards had been issued to 42 employees. The related expenditures totaled approximately \$779,000 from October 2009 (program inception) to June 2011. Our review disclosed the following conditions:

- SU had not developed formal written policies and procedures to establish internal controls over the program, such as to identify allowable travel-related expenditures and to establish a review and approval process. These policies and procedures should also be used to ensure that credit limits for individual cards are appropriate in relation to usage, that cards are issued only to employees who require them on a regular basis for their job duties, and that purchases are supported by appropriate documentation.
- Credit limits for certain cardholders were excessive in relation to card usage. We reviewed the activity during the period from October 2009 to June 2011 for 10 cardholders that were active for at least six months and that had credit limits ranging between \$10,000 and \$25,000. Our review disclosed that, for the months the cards were actually used, the average monthly expenditure for 8 of these cards was less than half of the monthly credit limits. In addition, 3 of the 8 cards had little or no activity during the period tested. Assigning unnecessarily high credit limits increases SU's exposure to potential fraud and abuse.
- SU failed to promptly cancel two accounts when the cardholders terminated employment. Specifically, our test of eight cancelled accounts disclosed that two remained active for 34 days and 185 days after the cardholders had separated from employment. We noted no charges were incurred on these accounts subsequent to the employees' departures.

- Our test of 20 transactions, totaling \$64,523, disclosed that 5 transactions, totaling approximately \$10,000, were not supported by itemized receipts. Three of the transactions were supported by credit card receipts that did not provide details of the items purchased and the other two transactions were supported by handwritten documentation.

SU's travel-related credit card program began in October 2009 and uses a credit card vendor originally procured by the University of Maryland, College Park. This program is separate from the State's corporate purchasing card program, administered by the General Accounting Division of the Comptroller of Maryland, in which SU also participates.

Recommendation 2

We recommend that SU

- a. establish formal policies and procedures regarding the administration of its travel-related credit card program;**
- b. establish credit card limits that are commensurate with purchasing card usage and periodically review and adjust credit limits, when necessary;**
- c. promptly cancel credit card accounts of individuals no longer employed by SU; and**
- d. ensure that proper documentation is provided to support all transactions.**

Bookstore

Finding 3

SU had not established adequate controls over the bookstore's point-of-sale system and purchases for its bookstore operation.

Analysis

SU did not establish adequate controls over its bookstore operations. Our review disclosed the following conditions:

- SU did not use available security features of its point-of-sale system to properly restrict employee access. Three employees had system access capabilities that granted them unrestricted system administrator access to the point-of-sale system, which is used by the bookstore as its cashiering, purchasing, and inventory control system. These system access capabilities included the ability to change the access level of other bookstore employees. This access was not necessary for these three employees to perform their job responsibilities.

- One of these employees was also responsible for initiating purchase orders, receiving the related goods, and approving the related invoices. As a result, unauthorized transactions could be processed. This employee was also responsible for reviewing and approving voids and had the capability to process voids. While not a regular job duty, this employee could gain access to cash receipts creating a situation in which improprieties could occur. According to SU's records, the bookstore's cash receipts totaled \$645,000 during fiscal year 2011.
- Purchase orders created on the bookstore point-of-sale system were not required to be independently approved prior to issuance.

The Comptroller of Maryland's *Accounting Procedures Manual* requires an adequate segregation of duties over the purchasing, receiving, approval, and payment functions, as well as over cash receipts handling duties. During fiscal year 2011, total bookstore expenditures related to items for resale totaled approximately \$3.5 million.

Recommendation 3

We recommend that SU

- a. use the security features within the system to restrict critical access capabilities to individuals who require such access;**
- b. adequately separate the duties over the bookstore operations including procurement, invoice approval, and receipt of goods, as well as the review and approval of voided transactions; and**
- c. ensure all purchase orders are properly approved.**

We advised SU on accomplishing the necessary separation of duties using existing personnel.

Financial Management System Access

Finding 4

SU had not restricted user access capabilities for certain critical applications on its financial management system.

Analysis

SU did not adequately restrict employee access to critical applications on its financial management system. Our review of 10 critical applications related to student accounts receivable determined that 63 active system users were assigned to critical applications. However, 46 of these system users did not need access to

one or more of the 10 critical applications reviewed to perform their assigned duties. For example, our review disclosed that of the 15 employees that could process non-cash credit transactions, 11 of the employees did not require such access to perform their job duties. Furthermore, 8 of the 15 employees also had the capability to post payments to student accounts and had access to the related cash receipts resulting in duties not being properly segregated. We provided SU with a detailed listing of the 10 applications reviewed and the related unnecessary access capabilities and segregation of duties issues.

In addition, our review of critical applications related to student financial aid disclosed that one system user, with the capability to remove financial aid holds from a student's account, did not need such access to perform the user's assigned duties. A financial aid hold is placed on a student's account to prevent the student from receiving the financial aid, such as when the student has not submitted all of the required financial aid documentation.

The State's Department of Information Technology *Information Security Policy* specifies that State agencies are responsible for ensuring separation of duties and assigning appropriate system permissions and responsibilities for agency system users.

Recommendation 4

We recommend that SU appropriately restrict user access capabilities for critical applications to those employees who require the capabilities to perform their assigned job duties and in a manner that ensures a proper segregation of duties.

Student Accounts Receivable

Finding 5

Internal controls were inadequate to ensure that non-cash credit adjustments recorded in student accounts were proper.

Analysis

Internal controls related to the review of non-cash credit adjustments recorded in student accounts were inadequate. Specifically, the monthly report of non-cash credits, used to identify transactions for supervisory review, did not include adjustments processed by all employees since the report only focused on transactions made by employees working in the student accounts receivable unit. Furthermore, although certain adjustments were then identified for review (that is, to sight supporting documentation), some types of adjustments (such as

adjustments related to CCU activity) were excluded from the selection process. Finally, the employee performing the review also had the capability to process non-cash credits and post payments to student accounts, and had access to the related cash receipts. As a result, unauthorized adjustments could be recorded to student accounts without detection. According to SU's records, non-cash credit adjustments posted to student accounts during fiscal year 2011 totaled approximately \$13.7 million.

Recommendation 5

We recommend that SU

- a. ensure that the report of non-cash credits used for verification includes adjustments processed by all individuals with the capability to process non-cash credits,**
- b. ensure that all types of non-cash credits are subject to the selection process for an independent review, and**
- c. ensure that the review of non-cash credits is performed by an employee that does not have the capability to process non-cash credits.**

We advised SU on accomplishing the necessary separation of duties using existing personnel.

Materials and Supplies

Finding 6

Procedures and controls over SU's dietary inventory for dining services were not adequate.

Analysis

SU had not established adequate internal controls over the dietary inventory. According to the State's accounting records, purchases by dining services for dietary materials and supplies for fiscal year 2011 totaled approximately \$3.6 million. Additionally, according to SU records, the dietary materials and supplies inventory totaled approximately \$110,000 as of June 30, 2011. Our review disclosed the following conditions:

- The employee who recorded additions to the perpetual inventory records had routine access to the storeroom and was also responsible for posting inventory adjustments to the perpetual records. Furthermore, 3 of the 13 employees who conducted the physical inventories were not independent, as they also had routine access to the storerooms and were authorized to sign requisition forms.

- While SU performed a physical inventory of dietary materials and supplies on an annual basis, there was no documentation that variances between the physical inventory and the perpetual inventory records were investigated and resolved.
- Requisitions of dietary items withdrawn from storage were not properly documented for control purposes. Specifically, a copy of each completed requisition form was not provided to the employee(s) who received the items. As a result, SU could not compare the items recorded on the inventory records as withdrawn with the items that were actually received by the requisitioning employee(s).

As a result of these deficiencies, SU's management may not readily detect irregularities related to these inventories. In this regard, our physical count of dietary items disclosed variances between our counts and the quantities on hand according to the perpetual inventory records. Specifically, for 7 of the 10 items tested, we counted a total of 534 units while the perpetual inventory records reflected a total of 787 units on hand. The aggregate dollar value of the variances totaled approximately \$1,712. SU management personnel were unable to explain these variances. USM's *Policy for Capitalization and Inventory Control* policy requires institutions to maintain an inventory system appropriate to the value of the items held for resale.

Recommendation 6

We recommend that SU

- ensure that employees who maintain the perpetual inventory records and who perform the physical inventories do not have routine physical access to the dietary inventory;**
- ensure that variances between the physical inventory and the inventory records are investigated and resolved and that the results are documented;**
- ensure that employees who receive requisitioned dietary items sign the completed requisitions and retain copies of the completed requisitions; and**
- compare, at least on a test basis, withdrawals posted to the perpetual inventory records to the signed copies of the requisitions retained by the employees who received the requisitioned items.**

We advised SU on accomplishing the necessary separation of duties using existing personnel.

Audit Scope, Objectives, and Methodology

We have audited the University System of Maryland (USM) – Salisbury University (SU) for the period beginning August 28, 2008 and ending June 30, 2011. The audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

As prescribed by the State Government Article, Section 2-1221 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, the objectives of this audit were to examine SU's financial transactions, records and internal control, and to evaluate its compliance with applicable State laws, rules, and regulations. We also determined the status of the findings contained in our preceding audit report.

In planning and conducting our audit, we focused on the major financial-related areas of operations based on assessments of materiality and risk. The areas addressed by the audit included purchases and disbursements, student accounts receivable, financial aid, cash receipts, payroll, materials and supplies, and information technology systems. Our audit procedures included inquiries of appropriate personnel, inspections of documents and records, and observations of SU operations. We also tested transactions and performed other auditing procedures that we considered necessary to achieve our objectives. Data provided in this report for background or informational purposes were deemed reasonable, but were not independently verified.

Our audit did not include certain support services provided to SU by the USM Office. These support services (for example bond financing) are included within the scope of our audit of the USM Office. In addition, our audit did not include an evaluation of internal controls for federal financial assistance programs and an assessment of SU's compliance with federal laws and regulations pertaining to those programs because the State of Maryland engages an independent accounting firm to annually audit such programs administered by State agencies, including the components of the USM.

SU's management is responsible for establishing and maintaining effective internal control. Internal control is a process designed to provide reasonable assurance that objectives pertaining to the reliability of financial records, effectiveness and efficiency of operations including safeguarding of assets, and compliance with applicable laws, rules, and regulations are achieved.

Because of inherent limitations in internal control, errors or fraud may nevertheless occur and not be detected. Also, projections of any evaluation of internal control to future periods are subject to the risk that conditions may change or compliance with policies and procedures may deteriorate.

Our reports are designed to assist the Maryland General Assembly in exercising its legislative oversight function and to provide constructive recommendations for improving State operations. As a result, our reports generally do not address activities we reviewed that are functioning properly.

This report includes findings that we consider to be significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal control that could adversely affect SU's ability to maintain reliable financial records, operate effectively and efficiently, and/or comply with applicable laws, rules, and regulations. Our report also includes findings regarding significant instances of noncompliance with applicable laws, rules, or regulations. Other less significant findings were communicated to SU that did not warrant inclusion in this report.

The USM Office's response, on behalf of SU, to our findings and recommendations is included as an appendix to this report. As prescribed in the State Government Article, Section 2-1224 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, we will advise the USM Office regarding the results of our review of its response.

APPENDIX



OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR

July 5, 2012

Mr. Bruce A. Myers, CPA
Legislative Auditor
Office of Legislative Audits
State Office Building, Room 1202
301 West Preston Street
Baltimore, MD 21201

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University of Maryland,
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Eastern Shore

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Coppin State University

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Salisbury University

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University of Baltimore

1925
University of Maryland
Center for Environmental
Science

1947
University of Maryland
University College

1966
University of Maryland,
Baltimore County

RE: University System of Maryland – Salisbury
University
Period of Audit: August 28, 2008
Through June 30, 2011

Dear Mr. Myers:

I have enclosed the University System of Maryland's responses to your draft report covering the examination of the accounts and records of Salisbury University. Our comments refer to the individual items in the report.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "WE Kirwan".

William E. Kirwan
Chancellor

WEK:mk
Enclosures

cc:

Dr. Janet Dudley-Eshbach
Mr. James L. Shea, Chair, Board of Regents
Mr. Anwar Hasan, Chairman, MHEC
Dr. Danette Howard, Secretary of Higher Education, MHEC
Mr. Robert Page, Comptroller, USM Office
Mr. David Mosca, Director of Internal Audit, USM Office

Findings and Recommendations

Purchasing and Disbursements

Finding 1

Salisbury University's (SU) procurement and payment processing procedures were not always followed.

Recommendation

We recommend that SU

- a. obtain the proper invoice approvals prior to payment;**
- b. ensure that prices paid for goods and services are in accordance with the approved contract prices; and**
- c. use statewide technology contracts for the procurement of computer equipment, or obtain competitive bids, as required.**

Response

The University agrees with the finding. Because of the volume of monthly invoices (about 130) and the State's requirement to pay invoices timely, the University's energy manager had been analyzing utility invoices after payment was made. If a billing rate issue occurred, and we cannot recall any in the last ten years, we would resolve it with the utility company afterwards. Consequently, though we agree with the premise that invoice approval should occur prior to payment, it was more important that we paid these utility bills timely than it was to ensure that all were reviewed prior to payment. Despite this, we began reviewing and approving utility invoices prior to payment during December 2011.

Starting in December 2011, the University has begun documenting that statewide contract pricing is being received.

The University is using statewide contracts or obtaining and documenting competitive bids. The procurement finding noted above is an isolated instance. The buyer believed he was using a state-wide contract for Brand "A", but we realized later that the state-wide contract was for dual branded equipment (Brand "A/B"). We did substantiate that we received a 36% discount on pricing, which exceeded what the state-wide contract minimally prescribed. We will exercise greater care in ensuring that either state-wide contracts are used or competitive bids are obtained.

Finding 2

Proper controls had not been established over credit cards used for travel-related expenditures.

Recommendation

We recommend that SU

- a. establish formal policies and procedures regarding the administration of its travel-related credit card program;**
- b. establish credit card limits that are commensurate with purchasing card usage and periodically review and adjust credit limits, when necessary;**
- c. promptly cancel credit card accounts of individuals no longer employed by SU; and**
- d. ensure that proper documentation is provided to support all transactions.**

Response

The University agrees with the finding. We believe that our cardholder agreement adequately addresses State, USM and University policies and procedures including expense propriety, review, approval and documentation. By August 1, 2012, we will establish more formal policies and procedures over the program. Even though the State has set no criteria for the establishment of credit card limits, on December 1, 2011, we began evaluating credit limits monthly and are setting limits based on historical and anticipated spending. We will promptly cancel credit cards and ensure that all transactions are properly supported.

Bookstore**Finding 3**

SU had not established adequate controls over the bookstore's point-of-sale system and purchases for its bookstore operation.

Recommendation

We recommend that SU

- a. use the security features within the system to restrict critical access capabilities to individuals who require such access;**
- b. adequately separate the duties over the bookstore operations including procurement, invoice approval, and receipt of goods, as well as the review and approval of voided transactions; and**
- c. ensure all purchase orders are properly approved.**

We advised SU on accomplishing the necessary separation of duties using existing personnel.

Response

The University agrees with the finding. On March 12, 2012, the vendor removed the system administration access from the three employees. By September 1, 2012, we will reevaluate all system security and assign access that appropriately corresponds with segregated job duties.

During July 2011, the aforementioned employee no longer initiated purchase orders or received goods. On June 25, 2012, this employee no longer processed voids.

On July 2, 2012, Bookstore purchase orders were approved prior to issuance.

Financial Management System Access

Finding 4

SU had not restricted user access capabilities for certain critical applications on its financial management system.

Recommendation

We recommend that SU appropriately restrict user access capabilities for critical applications to those employees who require the capabilities to perform their assigned job duties and in a manner that ensures a proper segregation of duties.

Response

The University agrees with the finding. In November 2011, we eliminated the unnecessary access regarding student grade changes. We eliminated the unnecessary access regarding the release of holds and residency changes (for 14 employees) on December 5, 2011 and December 16, 2011 respectively. During June 2011, unnecessary access related to non-cash credits, student refund creation and release, write-offs of student account balances, term rate adjustments, and payment posting was eliminated. As a result of these changes, the incompatible access was also eliminated. On February 6, 2012, we eliminated the capability of users to directly assign hold access. The PeopleSoft Security Administrator now assigns this security.

Student Accounts Receivable

Finding 5

Internal controls were inadequate to ensure that non-cash credit adjustments recorded in student accounts were proper.

Recommendation

We recommend that SU

- a. ensure that the report of non-cash credits used for verification includes adjustments processed by all individuals with the capability to process non-cash credits,**
- b. ensure that all types of non-cash credits are subject to the selection process for an independent review, and**
- c. ensure that the review of non-cash credits is performed by an employee that does not have the capability to process non-cash credits.**

We advised SU on accomplishing the necessary separation of duties using existing personnel.

Response

The University agrees with the finding. As noted in Finding 4, access to process non-cash credits was properly restricted to Accounts Receivable personnel only. This also means that the reviews are being conducted by an employee who cannot process non-cash credit adjustments. Beginning with September 2011 transactions, all appropriate non-cash credits are subject to an independent review. With concurrence from the OLA, we are excluding some non-cash credits including those created from tuition calculations and financial aid downloads.

Materials and Supplies

Finding 6

Procedures and controls over SU's dietary inventory for dining services were not adequate.

Recommendation

We recommend that SU

- a. ensure that employees who maintain the perpetual inventory records and who perform the physical inventories do not have routine physical access to the dietary inventory;**

- b. ensure that variances between the physical inventory and the inventory records are investigated and resolved and that the results are documented;**
- c. ensure that employees who receive requisitioned dietary items sign the completed requisitions and retain copies of the completed requisitions; and**
- d. compare, at least on a test basis, withdrawals posted to the perpetual inventory records to the signed copies of the requisitions retained by the employees who received the requisitioned items.**

We advised SU on accomplishing the necessary separation of duties using existing personnel.

Response

The University agrees with the finding. We have segregated duties so that employees who maintain perpetual inventory records and conduct physical inventories do not have routine physical access to the inventory. Semi-annual inventories will be conducted and any variances to the perpetual inventory records will be investigated and resolved. Inventory results and adjustments will be reviewed by management. We are using Requisition Worksheets from the dining system to document inventory withdrawals. The Requisition Worksheets are signed by the requester and the storekeeper and are used by independent employees to post the withdrawals to the inventory system. Another employee verifies the system withdrawal postings to the appropriate Requisition Worksheet copy.

AUDIT TEAM

William R. Smith, CPA

Audit Manager

Richard L. Carter, CISA

Stephen P. Jersey, CPA, CISA

Information Systems Audit Managers

Ken H. Johanning, CFE

Senior Auditor

Michael K. Bliss, CISA

R. Brendan Coffey, CPA

Information Systems Senior Auditors

R. Frank Abel, CPA, CFE

Joseph E. McWilliams

Peter Rorick

Staff Auditors

Christopher D. Jackson

Information Systems Staff Auditor